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Richard Jefferson1 
 
 
Nearly four billion people live on daily incomes lower than the price of a 
latté at Starbucks.  Most of them make dramatically less than that—and 
from that income, they must acquire their food, their medicine, their 
shelter and clothing, their education, and their recreation, and they must 
build their future and their dreams.  Their lives, and the quality of their 
lives, hinge on biological innovation. 
Biological innovation is the ability to harness living systems for our 
social, environmental and economic well-being.  It is the oldest and most 
fundamental form of human innovation, involving as it does the getting 
of food, the striving for health, the making of homes, and the building 
of communities.  The wealth created over the millennia through the 
domestication and husbandry of plants and animals has powered human 
society. 
Of all areas of biological innovation, agriculture is the most important, 
affecting our environment, our health, our economies, and the fabric of 
our societies.  The world’s poorest nations depend largely on agriculture 
for their economic survival as well as their food, fuel and fibre.  The 
challenges of innovation to create and sustain productive and 
environmentally sound agriculture are even more pronounced in these 
societies.  Any failure to do so has enormous implications for the global 
community, over and above the social, economic, and environmental 
impacts. 
For thousands of years biological innovation has been informed and 
guided by keen observation and the accumulation and sharing of 
generations of empirical knowledge.  Farmers selected better crop 
varieties and livestock breeds, and developed management strategies to 
                                                        
1 Richard Jefferson is the founder and CEO of CAMBIA-BiOS.  This chapter was first 
published as an article in (2006) 1 (4) Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization 13–44. 
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maximise their performance.  Seeds were shared as a practical matter of 
survival and each improvement formed the basis for further innovation.  
Because seeds of most crop plants breed true, the ease of sharing, and 
the barriers to doing so were minimal.  As with digital information, it is 
hard not to share, and hard to impose limits on sharing, so norms evolve 
to maximise value from this inevitability. 
But the post-Enlightenment explosion of possibility that began when the 
unprecedented power of science became focused on food, agriculture, 
health, medicine and environment seemed to dwarf all previous 
attainments.  And indeed in the past hundred years, with the advent of 
genetics, the pace has been gathering; the last 30 years has seen an 
unprecedented dynamism in life sciences that is being hailed as a 
‘biotechnology revolution’.  But in this revolution, biotechnology is 
rarely being applied to the critical issues of alleviating poverty, 
eliminating hunger, stewarding natural resources, and preventing or 
curing the diseases of the disadvantaged.  The margins are small, the 
markets are modest, and the challenges are great.  Are the paradigms and 
practices that have emerged to harness science for society sufficient to 
engage, and even solve, these seemingly intractable problems?  
Today control over agricultural biotechnology is effectively limited to a 
few multinational corporations who integrate seeds, agrichemicals, and 
biotechnology.  This disturbing consolidation of power is matched with 
a trend toward ‘me-too’, big-ticket ‘innovations’ of remarkable dullness.  
How many herbicide-tolerant big acreage crops are enough?  Similar 
trends are surfacing among the large pharmaceutical companies, 
collectively known as ‘big-pharma’: how many blockbuster lifestyle drugs 
does society need? 
Within the value system they respect, and according to their own success 
metrics of profitability, big agriculture and big pharma are not abject 
failures, but they surely are not enough. 
To address the myriad challenges of agriculture, environment and health 
that are local in nature and modest in market or profit margins will 
require vigorous, competitive, local-scale small to medium enterprises 
creating a business and innovation ecology.  It will also require a 
biological innovation culture where the costs of innovation are low, and 
the power and relevance of technology are high.  It will require 
leveraging the contributions of diverse people and institutions to create 
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tools that better engage science into an integrated and economically 
sustainable social agenda.  
The mission of CAMBIA, of which I am the founder, is to advance this 
set of required capabilities so that biological innovation can address the 
human challenges of the 21st century; the BiOS (Biological Open 
Source) Initiative is CAMBIA’s mechanism for achieving its mission. 
The term ‘open source’ describes a paradigm for software development 
associated with a set of innovation practices.  The concept evolved out 
of the ‘free soft-ware’ movement, and is often merged into the 
expression ‘free and open source software’ (see text box.)  Several 
features together qualify a project as ‘open source’.2  These include full 
disclosure of enabling information including documented source code 
and the use of legal instruments such as copyright licenses to confer 
both permissive rights and responsibilities; they bind contributions into 
a commons that is accessible to all who agree to share alike.  Typically, 
certain practices and cultural norms are associated with distributive 
innovation, although this is by no means required; some very successful 
free and open source software projects have only a few serious 
contributors, while others have thousands. 
Extraordinary efficiencies occur when the tools of innovation are shared, 
are dynamically enhanced, have increased levels of confidence (legal and 
otherwise) associated with their use, and are low or no-cost.  Rent 
extraction from the process of innovation is reduced, transactions costs 
are minimised and developers focus their resources on creating revenue 
by providing products and services and enlarging markets. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
2 For example <www.opensource.org>. 
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How Do You Make Money in Open Source? 
Free and open source software has rapidly engendered highly productive 
and profitable business models that create value from the non-rivalrous3 
use of software components.  Examples of such software include the 
famous Linux operating system, the Apache web server, databases such 
as MySQL, myriad programming languages such as Perl and Python, and 
the Firefox web browser.  These types of open source projects, co-
developed by thousands of programmers, and shared through creative 
licensing which demands covenants of behaviour rather than financial 
consideration from the licit community of users, have transformed the 
information and communications technology (ICT) sector. 
Most of the high-profile free and open source software projects that 
have affected both the sector and the public’s imagination have been 
‘tools’ and platforms, rather than end-user applications.  These allow 
users to build fully commercial web applications, with high functionality, 
on robust, dynamic platforms, with no reach-through financial 
obligations.  The economic success stories of free and open source 
software thus are not Linux and Apache, but eBay and Google.  The 
business models that are shaking the ICT world are not the modest ones 
selling support for open source products, such as Red Hat Linux.  The 
signal successes are commercial enterprises that create wealth by 
providing new social value.  Many ask, ‘How do you make money in 
open source?’  The answer: you make money not by selling open source, 
but by using open source. 
 
This concept is fully generalisable—although clearly the specifics are 
not—and a large part of CAMBIA’s BiOS initiative explores and extends 
the software metaphor.  BiOS strives to create new norms and practices 
for dynamically designing and creating the tools of biological innovation, 
with binding covenants to protect and preserve their usefulness, while 
allowing diverse business models for wealth creation, using these tools. 
                                                        
3 In economics, a good is considered either rivalrous (rival) or nonrival.  Rival goods are gods 
whose consumption by one consumer prevents simultaneous consumption by other 
consumers.  In contrast, nonrival goods may be consumed by one consumer without 
preventing simultaneous consumption by others.  Most examples of nonrival goods are 
intangible goods (Wikipedia, 2007).  
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In the first part of this chapter I discuss the simultaneous burst of 
knowledge in molecular biology and the precipitous decline of a 
commons of tools, using examples from plant biotechnology.  I develop 
a practical model of innovation, highlighting how biological innovation 
is stymied or deflected to high margin applications if tools are not freely 
available, continuously improving and embodying the permission to 
deliver work product into markets.  I explore parallels, divergences and 
resonance with open source paradigms in software engineering.  The rest 
of the chapter focuses on CAMBIA BiOS Initiative activities: the BiOS 
Framework, the Patent Lens, and the BioForge, and the creation of a 
‘commons of capability’ through which new actors, including farmers 
and small-to-medium enterprise, can use science to create viable 
innovations relevant to their needs. 
POWER, TOOLS AND THE COMMONS OF 
CAPABILITY  
Twenty-eight years ago, I began a project to develop a set of tools—of 
techniques—in molecular biology that could help researchers in that 
field visualise how genes and cells functioned.  Like virtually all scientific 
work, and most technology development, it was inspired and informed 
by what came before.  And like all tools and methods, it depends on the 
use of other tools and methods. 
Some years earlier, Ethan Signer, Jonathan Beckwith, and others had 
made a remarkable contribution to our toolkit for understanding how 
genes worked in bacteria.  They conceived of a single tool that would 
allow scientists to learn how genes turn on and off in a bacterium.  The 
tool ‘hooked up’ the beta-galactosidase gene (called lac) for which they 
had simple measurement tools and assays, to another gene (called trp) 
for which measurement was difficult, but whose behaviour they were 
keen to understand.  In so doing, they measured the trp gene by actually 
measuring lac.  This tour de force of microbial genetics used publicly 
available technologies and methods—in fact it was then unthinkable that 
there would be any other kind.  This occurred well before the advent of 
recombinant DNA, which now allows apparently sophisticated genetic 
experiments to be done very simply.  And it occurred well before anyone 
had even contemplated patents on life sciences. 
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Years later, I thought, why not use the same concept to understand how 
cells in animals and plants work?  Why not have the organisms talk to us 
about their environment, through their genes?  I set out to develop a 
parallel system, using a different enzyme and gene that could function in 
these new organisms.  The one I chose was prosaically called GUS. 
As I worked, I became increasingly aware that the availability of tools, 
and their capabilities, completely dictated the science that was done, and 
who was doing it.  As an undergraduate at the University of California 
and the University of Edinburgh, I worked in some of the key 
laboratories responsible for inventing recombinant DNA methodology.  
I watched, time and again, how an entire field of scientific endeavour 
would almost instantly change course when a new technique—tool—
was provided. 
When I first developed the GUS technology, the scientific community I 
was originally working within—which studied animal embryo 
development—was not very interested; the tool just wasn’t needed 
much.  My first paper on this topic was received with an ill-stifled yawn.  
But I moved my interests to plants and agriculture, during the heady 
dawn of plant molecular genetics. 
Efforts to transfer beneficial genes into key crops such as cotton, 
soybean, maize, and rice were running into a brick wall.  There was no 
way to visualise success, nor to measure and improve on first steps.  The 
GUS reporter system made visualising genes and their action in plants 
very easy and efficient—it was proving to be a very powerful tool at the 
right time. 
In 1985 I arrived for my postdoctoral research at the Plant Breeding 
Institute (PBI) in Cambridge, England, a vigorous international group of 
colleagues who were at the cutting edge of technology development and 
exploration in molecular plant sciences.  The Plant Breeding Institute 
was also one of the few sites in the world that combined the patient and 
disciplined craft of successful agricultural innovation, such as plant 
breeding and agronomy, with the impatient and fermenting world of 
molecular biology.  As well, the Plant Breeding Institute was still at that 
time an entity focused on the public good, a non-profit institute that 
earned substantial income for the U.K. government through royalties on 
its own crop varieties. 
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At Plant Breeding Institute, my colleagues4 and I designed and 
conducted the first field test of a transgenic food crop.  It was also the 
first BioSentinel experiment: a gene we wished to study was fused to the 
GUS gene, to conduct a field trial asking a fundamental question about 
how genes act under field conditions.  We used public money, in the 
public sector, to ask a fundamental question for the public.  The field 
was planted on 1 June 1987—completely by chance one day before 
Monsanto’s first field trial.  The lessons of the field trial were fascinating.  
We found that gene activity in a field is extraordinarily variable, and our 
preconceived laboratory-based notions of how genes worked would turn 
out to be very inadequate when dealing with field populations.  Our 
technology, though cutting-edge, was not up to the questions that real-
world agriculture presents. 
The Plant Breeding Institute was an international institute, with students 
and scientists from all over the world.  The institute had a reputation for 
brilliant wheat breeding and genetics, so most of the countries whose 
agriculture depended on cereal production would send their scientists to 
us for training.  Many of the students and postdoctoral fellows in the 
Molecular Genetics department came from India, Pakistan, Turkey, the 
Middle East, China, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.  Most 
of them indicated that this period in Cambridge was their one shot at 
career establishment. If they published a paper or two in a good journal, 
they had a reasonable chance of employment back home.  And some of 
them confessed that they likely would not be able to use the new 
biotechnologies to effect any change in their home agriculture or 
economy.  Not only did they lack the finances and infrastructure to 
make use of these high-tech tools, but the tools were better for science 
than for problem solving. 
These people were exemplary of perhaps the most crucial but neglected 
resource for social advancement through science: dedicated and capable 
                                                        
4 Mike Bevan, my principal collaborator, went on to play a key role in coordinating the public 
sector sequencing of the Arabidopsis genome.  Arabidopsis is the workhorse model plant of 
biotechnology, and was the first plant to have its entire DNA sequence described in the 
literature.  The public efforts to create a public good, like some of mine, were likely co-opted by 
the secretive wholesale filing of patents on the Arabidopsis genome by Mendel Biotechnology, 
an affiliate of Monsanto.  These patents have only recently surfaced <www.patentlens.net> but 
pre-dated the public effort by as much as two years, thus potentially capturing or hijacking 
much publicly-funded work, through a legal, though unpalatable practice called ‘after-claiming’. 
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people.  I observed, however, that instead of using their own experience 
to inform the science that was being done and the technologies being 
developed, their own world-views and self-images were rapidly aligning 
to the incentive and reward system of the prevailing and fashionable 
science trends.  And their energy to change the options in their home 
countries was dissipating. 
By early 1987, after intensive experimentation in-house, we had 
assembled hundreds of copies of a GUS kit of dozens of DNA 
molecules and a comprehensive ‘how-to’ manual.  I rewrote the big 
‘GUS Manual’ and sent it to a mass-mailed newsletter called Plant 
Molecular Biology Reporter, which was distributed free to thousands of 
scientists rather than initially publishing a peer-reviewed scientific paper, 
which I eventually did.5  The grapevine is also a powerful 
communications tool in science; soon many people were hearing about 
this new technology that would let them see the cells and tissues where 
their gene was functioning.  It would also allow let them optimise gene 
delivery experiments; this was an urgent priority for both industry and 
academia.  At that time no important commercial crop had been 
genetically engineered, so requests started flooding in for the GUS 
system.  And I started sending out hundreds, even thousands of samples, 
and the User’s Manual, all with no licenses, to scientists in dozens of 
countries, in both the private and public sectors.  I only included a letter 
saying that while I had filed for a patent on the system, I wanted 
everyone to use it, and royalties—if any resulted—would go back to 
creating the next generation of technology. 
I sent the kit to scientists at Agracetus in Wisconsin who were working, 
with little success, on transferring genes to soybeans.  They had no idea 
if the genes they were introducing with their new process were actually 
making it into the right cells.  One of those scientists, Paul Christou, told 
me of their thrill when they were able to immediately visualise gene 
transfer with the blue colour of the GUS test, and soon succeeded at 
introducing genes into soybeans for the first time.  And they could only 
                                                        
5 R A Jefferson, T A Kavanagh and M W Bevan, ‘GUS fusions: beta-glucuronidase as a 
sensitive and versatile gene fusion marker in higher plants’ (1987) 6(13) European Molecular 
Biology Organization Journal 3901–7.  Apparently it has been read often, as it has been cited in the 
scientific literature thousands of times.  To our delight, however, the user’s manual in Plant 
Molecular Biology Reporter has been similarly cited, and likely more influential, in the 
precursor to the Open Access publishing movement. 
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do it with GUS, which also had no apparent restrictions.  They were 
delighted, of course, as was Monsanto, for whom they worked.6   
That work with GUS turned out to be the single biggest money maker in 
plant biotechnology, possibly ever in agriculture.  Monsanto developed 
its RoundUp Ready™ soybean line, which it ultimately used to breed 
most of the transgenic soybean plants now covering the world, using 
GUS to select plants. 
Within a year after we began widely distributing the GUS technology, 
hundreds of new avenues of plant science were emerging.  Within two 
years, breakthroughs in maize, soybean, cotton, and many other crops 
occurred.  New technologies were invented that used the tool in its very 
creation and optimisation, such as particle bombardment (the tool that 
Agracetus had been exploring) and critical improvements were made to 
core technologies such as gene transfer by Agrobacterium.  GUS 
demonstrated that one powerful new tool, widely distributed, could 
rapidly change an entire field. 
The idea of intentionally changing the directions of inquiry and the 
demographics and economics of problem-solving by designing and 
providing new tools would shape the next 30 years of my professional 
life.  With increasing exposure to the realities of practical agriculture, 
intellectual property, policy and business, my definition of ‘tool’ 
matured.  It came to include not just the technologies needed for 
scientific investigation, but also the critical normative, economic, policy, 
legal and business instruments to convert investigation into socially and 
economically sound innovations.  A business model really can be a tool. 
Enclosing the Toolkit: The Case of Agrobacterium 
But while this period hinted at the vast potential for new tools emerging 
from molecular biology to lead to rapid innovation, it also saw the rush 
to privatise the kinds of tools that had always been seen as a commons, 
as exemplified by the adventures of Agrobacterium.  When I started to 
work at Plant Breeding Institute, plant molecular genetics was in its 
infancy, and only three or four major institutions had serious capability 
                                                        
6 Monsanto later engaged Agracetus in a heated patent battle for the right to do genetic 
manipulations in soybeans, and ultimately purchased Agracetus and its patents.  At this point 
the patents owned by Agracetus ceased being seen as reprehensible and unfair, and were 
defended as pillars of rectitude. 
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in this nascent field.  All of them were using Agrobacterium-mediated 
transformation as their fundamental tool for transferring genes to plants. 
Several years earlier, several public research teams had discovered an 
astonishing biological phenomenon.7  A soil bacterium long known to 
be the agent of a familiar plant disease called crown gall was found to 
cause these tumours on plants by a hitherto unforeseen mechanism.  
The bacterium—Agrobacterium—actually inserted into the plant, by 
‘natural’ genetic engineering, a component of its own genome, and in so 
doing reprogrammed the plant to produce a ‘gall’ and new food for the 
bacterium.  This phenomenon, a sort of biological Trojan horse, was 
thought to be unique in the biological realm.  And everyone in plant 
biology saw that it was to be a critical tool in the development of new 
options of biotechnology. 
The groups that first made the discoveries were all in the public sector, 
funded largely by public monies; they could all see that Agrobacterium 
would be a fundamental tool of the field. In spite, or perhaps because of 
all this, the gold rush for patenting started.  And not only did the pioneer 
groups in the field file patents; over the next 20 years over a thousand 
patents were filed—and granted in many nations—that covered various 
aspects of Agrobacterium-mediated gene transfer.  Some were so minor 
and trite as to be laughable were they not presumed valid by law, but 
they still produced a thicket of rights, nearly impenetrable even to the 
specialist. 
And of course the pioneering patents were fought over viciously.  To 
monetise the patents, the rights were sold to the highest bidder.  But the 
rights were not clear; bitter wrangling over primacy with the 
fundamental patents continued for almost 20 years before any legal 
clarity emerged.  Of course the winning bidders ended up being large 
multinational companies, notably Monsanto (either directly or by 
acquisition); and in most cases the payments to universities and institutes 
were negligible or even negative.  But the effect of increasingly 
consolidating these patents in a few hands was anything but negligible. 
Soon, public and private sector scientists were patenting their 
developments as a matter of course.  Some of these findings became 
                                                        
7 These scientists included groups led by Mary Dell Chilton, Marc van Montagu, Eugene 
Nester, Jeff Schell, Pat Zambryski and others, at the University of Washington, the University 
of Ghent, the Max Planck Institute, and elsewhere. 
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powerful patent estates that potentially blocked most of the world’s 
agricultural enterprises from using these tools without permission, often 
at any price.  For example, Japan Tobacco discovered and patented a 
method to use Agrobacterium to transfer genes into rice and other cereal 
crops. 
The case of Agrobacterium was repeated with many subsequent 
technologies, ranging from genetic selections, to the wholesale patenting 
of promoters and genes,8 to gene inactivation technologies (such as 
RNAi and co-suppression).  Again, the contents of many patents were 
breathtakingly obvious to all practitioners in the field, but for small to 
medium-sized enterprises these patents still served as a real disincentive 
to innovate.  They also extracted huge rents from industry, and raised 
transaction costs to an unbearable level, mostly because the patent 
landscapes were so opaque and complex.  This trend has accelerated 
markedly and now applies to medical as well as agricultural technologies.  
The consequences are clearly that only the biggest-ticket targets are 
getting attention.  But blockbusters alone don’t make for good 
agriculture, good environmental management or good public health. 
In 1985 the sector was viewed as exhilarating, entrepreneurial and 
vibrant, with almost unlimited possibility for doing good in world 
agriculture; within a decade or so it had all but stalled into a corporate 
oligopoly, with vertical integration, ossified and oppressive business 
models, and massive patent portfolios tying up almost every key 
technology and platform used in the field.  And though nearly all the 
pioneering discoveries were made in the public sector, they were not 
reserved for public use or for the small-to-medium enterprise sector that 
the public trusts.  It is no surprise then that the public now views the 
entire agricultural biotechnology sector—as manifest in the outcry 
against GMOs—as being a tawdry exercise in failed promises, industry 
consolidation, public sector abandonment and simplistic agendas.  
Perhaps the greatest crisis that has emerged from this corporate control 
of problem-solving in agriculture is that the public now seems to have 
very little confidence in the use of any science in agriculture!  This has 
indeed been a case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater.9 
                                                        
8 See forthcoming ‘Patent Landscape on Patent Genomes’. 
9 R A Jefferson, ‘Transcending Transgenics: Is there a baby in that bathwater, or is it a dorsal 
fin?’ in Phil Phardey (ed), The Future of Food (2001) 75.  
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Biotech Bazaar: Tools for Sale 
At the Plant Breeding Institute, I was working with colleagues from 
scientific cultures that had historically used the discoveries and 
technologies that came before to grapple with the next generation of 
scientific challenges, with the tacit understanding that this process would 
naturally yield real-world solutions, such as plant varieties and agronomic 
processes.  After all, the Plant Breeding Institute paid its way in the 
world by doing just this. 
But that world was collapsing.  The distinction between discovery and 
invention was being blurred as patents were filed on each component; 
that process entirely altered the dynamic of translation into true 
innovation: delivering the products of science and technology to the 
marketplace.  It was now possible to control the tools and platform 
discoveries themselves, not just the products that they created. 
In the early 1980s with the passing of the Bayh-Dole Act, universities in 
the United States were actively encouraged to patent their work 
products.  The Act’s fundamental policy goal was to see publicly-funded 
science and technology better used by society, by encouraging industry 
to adopt it.  The trend of public agencies using the patent system 
exploded internationally into a filing frenzy.  No one foresaw then that 
the fragmentation of the platforms and tools would make it so complex, 
so expensive and so intractable to assemble the ‘freedom to operate and 
freedom to innovate’.  Nor did we see that the resulting innovations 
themselves would be so few, so stodgy, and so slow to reach the 
marketplace. 
At almost the same time, the advent of recombinant DNA and the 
ability to determine DNA and protein sequences massively increased 
scientists’ ability to explore, understand, and manipulate living systems, 
or at least living organisms.  So every new life sciences discovery could 
be, and often was, dressed up as an invention and subject to patent; as 
the patent claims were granted, they cast a huge net over the possible 
options.  Public sector coalitions would frequently compete with private 
big-science, and who usually won the plum of patent monopoly?  The 
privatised efforts.  Was this right, or necessary?  
I began my own foray into patents and their importance when I arrived 
in Cambridge in 1986.  I discovered close relationships between some 
large companies and the public-sector institute where I was based, 
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shaped by personal histories and friendships.  I didn’t view this as a bad 
thing.  I shared all my ideas and technologies with them from the outset.  
In fact, I shared with pretty much anyone who was interested, thinking 
that—in economic terms—my ideas were non-rival; sharing didn’t cost 
me the ability to use them myself.  How wrong I would later prove to 
be.10  And how times  were changing. 
One company, ICI,11 was keen to use GUS in its commercial 
development pro-grams; like many companies it was mostly interested in 
having clear rights to do so.  ICI suggested that I patent my technology 
so it could be sure it would have access to GUS in the future.  I didn’t 
understand the logic at the time, but I took the first steps and filed a 
patent in the United Kingdom and the United States, with a filing date in 
1986.  The University of Colorado, where the first stages of the work 
had been done, had waived its interest in patenting it. 
Thus began a long and painful learning process of partnerships with 
powerful attorneys in which I watched patent-craft by The Masters.  It 
took almost seven years for my first patent to issue in the USA, and nine 
years for the one with most of the valuable claims.  Even when it was 
issued, complex agendas and issues12 kept me from licensing the patents 
or even having a clear title for quite some time.  This delay wrought 
havoc with my ambitions to use patents to create and fund CAMBIA, 
and when revenue did come in, it was in sporadic bursts, and barely in 
time to make payroll. 
As a technology, GUS has had a surprisingly long shelf-life, and is 
unusual in being a largely stand-alone technology.  If one has the ‘right’ 
to put a gene into a plant, GUS remained a useful and legally usable tool 
to monitor that gene and its activity.  But it turned out that even that 
right, the legal permission to transfer a gene to a plant, proved to be a 
critical and contentious issue because patents are opaque and licensing 
rights even more so, and because advances in the life sciences are so 
interdependent. 
                                                        
10 See appendix on positive selection.  
11 Imperial  Chemical Industries; its plant work was later absorbed into Zeneca and then into 
Syngenta. 
12 More details on the complexities of this period can be found in Richard Poynder, Interview 
with Richard Jefferson (online interview) The Basement Interview: Biological Open Source, 
<http://poynder.blogspot.com/2006/09/interview-with-richard-jefferson.html>. 
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Wheels and Spokes: The Interdependency of Technologies 
The patent system is so complex it is almost awe-inspiring.  Single patent 
documents can run to hundreds of pages, with arcane language that few 
understand, and rights that courts interpret and re-interpret on the fly.  
Thousands of these can exist in a single field of innovation, with many 
thousands more latent in the system.  One or two—or none—may be, 
or may unexpectedly become, dominant.  Fundamental biological 
processes, such as the ubiquitous gene-regulation mechanism, RNAi, 
have been patented.  Most of the important genes of many important 
organisms—humans, rice, maize, mice—have been subject to patent 
applications and sometimes grants, many of them contestable by many 
separate claimants.  The platforms on which we must build are privatised 
and enclosed, but the owners and their ambitions are completely unclear; 
the platform for future innovation is built on shifting sand. 
But worse, while the ownership of the ‘patent’ itself is usually a matter of 
public record, the ownership of the rights—the most important feature 
of a patent—is completely obscured.  Nowhere, in most jurisdictions, is 
there recorded or available the patterns of power: who owns what rights.  
A university may own hundreds of patents, and may have sold off the 
rights to any of the useful ones, but who bought them?  The answer is 
rarely clear. 
When a small company licenses a patent, or develops its own patent 
portfolio, to whom has it licensed and on what terms?  The patterns of 
power and ownership are as important—and in the aggregate perhaps 
more important—than any other feature of a patent grant.  And yet we 
have no public information whatsoever, except in piecemeal and 
scattered disclosures.  Some jurisdictions, including Brazil and France, 
do impose a responsibility on licensees to disclose—at least to the patent 
office.  But most do not.  And none make it easy to find this 
information.  This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a researcher in 
a small- or medium-scale enterprise to assemble all the licenses or 
capabilities needed to refine and adapt a tool and ultimately to create an 
innovation that will help meet basic needs.   
And researchers need this information because few discoveries stand on 
their own, and even fewer inventions.  Not only do they each depend on 
the pre-existing knowledge base; they almost always incorporate 
components of many other technologies in their execution.  This is 
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particularly true of ‘meta-technologies’, tools and technologies with 
broad effects used by communities of innovators quite distant from the 
tool’s original inventor. 
Consider the wheel, perhaps a six-spoked wheel.  In some ways, it is the 
most fundamental and important tool in society.  It has countless uses 
unanticipated by its inventors; most were made by people who are not 
wheel-builders.  The wheel is only useful when it is used for something, 
such as moving a cart; its economic value to society lies not in the price 
of the wheel, but in the wealth created through the use of the wheel.   
If it takes all six spokes for this wheel to turn, and each of these spokes 
is potentially different in some way, we have a good metaphor for a 
modern biological technology.  Increasingly, biological technologies are 
not self-contained; rather they are rather interdependent technologies 
that require multiple key methods and components to function.  If one 
spoke is withheld, no wheel is built.  If one spoke is broken the wheel 
will jam.  And then the cart cannot move forward.  By analogy, the most 
powerful technologies can be considered as ‘wheels’, requiring a number 
of ‘spokes’ to function.  For instance, the ability to transfer a gene to a 
crop plant may require dozens of individually protected, discrete 
technologies.  Denial of access to any one of these ‘spokes’ obstructs not 
only the use of the technology, but its improvement.  Only when the 
core technology is in place, with full functionality, can it be subject to 
iterative and cooperative shaping to meet diverse users’ needs. 
Unfortunately, even placing one or more key methods or components 
into the public domain allows no leverage to bring other components 
into a collective whole with broad access.  Virtually all the practices of 
academic scientists promote the belief that ‘good science’ can, almost by 
magic, transform itself into public or private goods.  It can’t.  In fact, by 
failing to deliver such goods with broad and preserved access, the public 
sector science community is complicit by neglect, because the true 
stranglehold rests where much less public sector effort is expended: in 
the process of converting invention and discovery into innovation, by 
building and using wheels. 
But we can change this landscape, if we provide one or more of the 
spokes to all the wheel-builders and users with covenants of behaviour, 
rather than financial consideration (outlined later as BiOS licenses).  If a 
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user can access a spoke only by promising to share spokes, or 
improvements, then the whole logic can change. 
This is where we find the leverage: change the logic of copyright licenses 
in software to allow free and open source software to exist, and do the 
same for patent licenses or Materials Transfer Agreements (MTAs) in 
BiOS.  Then we can regain a full complement of spokes, and see the 
‘wheels’ of real innovation turn rapidly and deploy on many roads, 
creating wealth through their use. 
How Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt Can Deter Innovation 
Uncertainties over intellectual property rights undermine the long-term 
and sustainable pursuit of innovation by making projects look more 
risky to potential partners and investors.  This risk combines with others 
characteristic of early stage technology development: lack of a fully-
specified business model, concerns over potential technology 
effectiveness, and the absence of a well-established delivery channel.  
Together they generate the fear, uncertainty and doubt (FUD, in the 
awkward but widely used acronym) that is the core impediment to 
technology development.  Currently, every worldwide industry that 
depends intensively on science and technology experiences FUD.  
Sometimes a competitor is the focus; sometimes the bleak patent 
situation alone can lead an investor, client, customer and/or the public 
to lose confidence in the prospects of creating a viable technology-
driven enterprise. 
In the face of the uncertainties associated with the complex and opaque 
patent situation, multinational private-sector firms have responded by 
acquiring large IP portfolios and negotiating cross-licensing 
arrangements to obtain platforms of enabling technologies.  Even so, 
these companies still often find themselves with constrained freedom to 
operate.  Faced with the uncertainty of patent rights, they seem to be 
involved in a sort of mutually assured destruction. 
In contrast, the public-good sector, and small-to-medium enterprises 
have only fragmentary portfolios, often made up of publicly-developed 
technology and modest non-fixed capital pools that they believe can be 
expanded by their eagerness to license them out, but they are at a grave 
disadvantage; they face a monopsony. 
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Unfortunately, this approach not only destroys public value and 
confidence; it is also ineffective in ensuring a sustainable private 
competitive advantage.  As the expense of sequestering intellectual 
property outside the public domain in iterative patents has increased, 
some leading technology firms have decided that an open source model 
may yield higher private, as well as public, returns.  A notable example is 
IBM Corporation; in a bold recent move it is stimulating a universally 
accessible ‘protected commons’ of patents in a pool available for any 
open source development.  As the world’s largest patent holder, IBM 
could be viewed as a ‘rights maximalist’; over 500 of its key software 
patents have been made available to all—including competitors—who 
choose to use them under open source rules.  Within days, Sun 
Microsystems followed suit with another 1600 patents, and a myriad of 
other companies are doing the same. The snowball effect continues, as 
companies realise that their sector makes progress when the standards 
and the toolkits are clear, open, of high quality and consistently available. 
Clearly, true wealth creation will come not through extracting rent from 
a tool, but through using a continuously improving toolkit, with 
continuously decreasing costs of innovation and a continuously 
expanding group of tool users.  Diverse and prosperous agriculture, 
robust public health and sustainable natural resource management are 
the publicly valuable goals we must keep in clear sight.  The tools 
associated with their improvements must be plentiful, powerful and 
affordable. 
As the ICT sector realised, we also need an open source movement in 
biological innovation that can empower public and private sector 
innovators with the tools, platforms and paradigms to allow rapid and 
efficient life-sciences innovations for neglected priorities and new 
opportunities. 
CREATING CAMBIA, MAKING CHANGE 
In the mid-1980s, when I first formulated the ideas that became 
CAMBIA, I did not intend to build an institution; I spent much time 
between 1987 and 1990 trying unsuccessfully to convince universities or 
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later the United Nations or the CGIAR13 system to take on and host 
CAMBIA’s mission.  But the complexity and edgy nature of the mission, 
the need to integrate diverse skills and strategies, and the entrepreneurial 
spirit, ultimately required an independent base. 
In early 1992 I moved to Canberra, Australia, to begin a project on 
behalf of the Rockefeller Foundation, troubleshooting its rice 
biotechnology network in Asia.  At this point CAMBIA was not a legally 
incorporated body, but had reams of letterhead and surprising 
credibility.  Our job was to travel to virtually every laboratory in the 
developing world that had Rockefeller Foundation support—and over 
the next eight years this must have been hundreds—to help develop, 
improve, and apply their biotechnology capabilities, especially as they 
pertained to rice molecular biology.  We developed and provided to 
many hundreds of labs—perhaps over a thousand—the most effective 
and widely used ‘vectors’ in plant molecular biology, the pCAMBIA 
series, and provided courses and workshops in the science and 
increasingly over time, in intellectual property management.  In 
hundreds of working visits to China, Indonesia, India, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Vietnam and many other countries of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, we forged a sense of the possibilities if we had new types of 
technologies, and new communities to improve and share them. 
During these years, as we became more sophisticated about licensing 
and understanding the patent systems, we also became more aware of 
the yawning gulf between biotechnology rhetoric and innovation realities 
in most of the world.  On the one hand we saw a large, untapped 
population of dedicated and knowledgeable problem solvers, committed 
to solve problems of real substance to their countries and peers—but 
they lacked the usable technologies that would improve their situation.  
We also saw that the science itself was not up to the job: the research 
being conducted in the early days of plant molecular biology (and sadly 
still now) is intensely reductionist, whereas the problems of agriculture 
and society are integrated into complex systems.  On the other hand, if 
we could design and provide tools that fit the problem and the hand of 
the tool-user, we could rapidly and effectively change the entire platform 
                                                        
13 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, <www.cigar.org>, a 
consortium of 15 agricultural research institutes and many governments, is the principal non-
profit entity engaged in agricultural development through science for poverty reduction. 
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of problem solving, as long as the tools were dynamic and could embody 
the permissions to integrate into real-world innovation.  CAMBIA was 
conceived to integrate and to address these issues. 
Outlined in the earliest CAMBIA prospectus was the premise of using 
patent revenues to create a sustainable funding base.  We surmised that 
we would ask a fair, tiered licensing fee of each company that was using 
the technology, proportionate to their ability to pay.  A big company 
pays a lot, mom-and-pop companies pay peanuts, developing countries 
pay nothing.  Then we would use the resulting revenue stream to invent 
and distribute the next generation of technology.  At the time it looked 
like a logical and efficient way to move the sector forward with fair and 
open competition, not for the capability to innovate, but for the 
innovations themselves. 
This worked to some extent, in that CAMBIA exists and might not have 
done so without patent revenues. Companies that licensed the 
technology range from giants like Monsanto, DuPont, Pioneer, Bayer, 
BASF, and Syngenta down to entities as small as the Hawaiian Papaya 
Growers Cooperative.  But we also realised we could not generalise or 
scale it as a business model in the current climate of fragmented rights 
and capabilities.  The transaction costs of negotiating licenses, as more 
and more ‘spokes’ were required to move forward, would simply be 
impossible to bear for any but the highest-margin applications. 
CAMBIA addresses these challenges through three interdependent 
activities: 
1. The BiOS Framework creates, validates and promulgates 
licensing tools, along with the norms and new business 
models to make use of strategies for ‘open source’ creation, 
improvement, and sharing of enabling technology. 
2. The Patent Lens is a platform to focus, understand, and 
investigate the patent rights and to inform practitioners and 
policy-makers. 
3. CAMBIA’s own research into creating and distributing key 
‘pump-priming’ enabling technologies is made available 
through our online interface, the BioForge. 
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The BiOS Framework 
Biological Open Source is a nascent movement, evocative of the 
transformative changes in information and communications 
technologies (ICTs) wrought by free and open source software (FOSS).  
The two movements share some goals: seeing transformational effects 
on a sector, and increasing the democratic involvement in problem 
solving; we are learning many lessons from the software world, and will 
continue to.  But it would be a mistake to push the comparison too far.  
BiOS concepts have emerged from 20 years within the life sciences and 
human development culture, to address the needs and challenges of 
biological innovation. 
The idea of using patent licenses not to extract a financial return from a 
user of a technology, but rather to impose a covenant of behaviour, is 
the single feature of BiOS that is most resonant with Free and Open 
Source Software.  We14 worked with small companies, university offices 
of technology transfer, attorneys and large multinational corporations to 
understand their concerns and experiences, and then create a platform to 
share productive and sustainable technology. 
Patent Lens: A Platform for Understanding IP Landscapes 
CAMBIA’s Patent Lens includes one of the world’s most 
comprehensive full-text searchable databases of patents; cost-free and 
available to anyone, it has a seven-year history of continued growth in 
features and power. It incorporates the full text of applications and 
granted patents from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCV) database, European and Australian 
jurisdictions, and their status and family relationships in many dozens of 
countries.  Its fast and user-friendly search engine has a nuanced 
interface and presents common and harmonised data structures so that 
these jurisdictions can be searched simultaneously. The Patent Lens is 
becoming an increasingly important resource as the fee-requiring ‘value-
added’ patent data providers continue to  consolidate. 
                                                        
14 Dr Marie Connett, CAMBIA’s Deputy CEO, a scientist, patent agent, and IP Manager, 
jumped into the deep end when she joined in 2005, and found herself working round the clock 
on creating the license, consulting with dozens of technology transfer professionals, lawyers, 
industry colleagues and scientists. 
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Because no national patent office has taken on the task of harmonising 
collections over many jurisdictions, the role of the ‘patent clergy’ 
remains central, and the gate-keeper functions of the information 
providers remain onerous.  National and regional patent offices provide 
quite variable free patent searching; some are appallingly primitive while 
others, like the European Patent Office, are quite sophisticated.  Patent 
offices, however, have complex relationships with commercial providers 
such as Thomson, which actually provide the patent offices with 
integrated searching functions for their own in-house use.  To further 
complicate the situation, commercial providers have been calling for a 
reduction in the role of national patent offices as ‘value added’ 
providers.  The need for a public good provider has never been greater. 
Patent Lens focuses on user-adaptability, integration, annotation 
capability and availability to the world community for free; these key 
features render it particularly helpful in efforts to restore public good 
and transparency as the raison d’etre of intellectual property systems. 
Technology Intellectual Property (IP) Landscapes  
IP Landscapes are analyses of key platform technologies, and the IP 
positions associated with their development and use.  They build on and 
use the patent database, but include much more than a collection of 
relevant patents.  Each landscape is a searching and analysis effort 
involving many person-months, by CAMBIA staff and soon others, who 
have particular knowledge of the science and technology and of patent 
claims.  Typically, patent ‘professionals’ within law firms accumulate 
billable hours by providing the same information over and over for 
different customers, and charging full fees again to update them 
periodically.  Increasingly we wish to do something no fee-requiring 
patent data provider will ever do: turn the landscapes into living 
repositories of constantly updated information, so no more updates will 
ever be required. 
The goal is to use the harmonised datasets to create a facility where 
distributed and diverse users can generate, link, and dynamically 
annotate patent landscape analyses through web interfaces.  The 
landscapes will ultimately become maps and decision support tools so 
users can distinguish green-fields from minefields in the long path from 
discovery to practical delivery of an innovation. 
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We have created a substantial number of such landscapes, in an early, 
hypertext-linked but basically flat structure. But we aim to enable the 
preparation of many more, by many people, by leveraging informatics to 
create ready frameworks and linkages between world patent literature 
and such resources as PubMed Central, and Google Scholar whose 
relevance engines can enrich the process.  Ultimately we see the 
navigation of technology landscapes as being a critical feature in research 
and development decision making, but people will only use them when 
their costs, in both time and money, are negligible and the relevance and 
utility of the guided decisions are clear. 
Patents, Policies & Practices  
This component includes tutorials that guide users in reading and 
interpreting patents; the aim is to make novices more sophisticated 
about the nuanced realities of intellectual property, particularly patents.  
It also includes Policy & Practices papers that describe and advocate for 
informed and productive changes in international, regional and national 
forums and laws. 
The goal is to forge a learning resource that participants in innovation 
systems at all levels—scientists and engineers, business and legal 
professionals, citizens and policy-makers—can use to learn of critical 
and timely issues relevant to improving the public good and social and 
economic value by engaging with the patent system. 
The standards of modern patents are widely viewed as execrable; though 
many patents are presumed valid by law, they are at best frivolous and 
often egregious.  We aspire to provide the public with tools to recognise 
and overturn such patents where they undermine progress or are being 
used without a long-term and well-articulated stake in industry or 
society. 
 
The basic premise underlying that license is that we would not charge 
any fee for use of the ‘basket’ of technologies with the patent estate 
being offered.  By making the license cost-free, we hoped to induce the 
most valuable contribution to the license community: ‘freedom to 
innovate’.  In exchange for full, unfettered commercial rights to our 
technologies, licensees are required to comply with three conditions: 
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à They will share with all BiOS licensees any improvements to 
the core technologies as defined, for which they seek any IP 
protection. 
à They agree not to assert over other BiOS licensees their own 
or third-party rights that might dominate the defined 
technologies. 
à They agree to share with the public any and all information 
about the biosafety of the defined technologies. 
 
Several further features of BiOS Certified licenses are very important: 
à The definitions are critical.  The core capabilities (enabling 
technologies, platforms) and their scope must be carefully 
defined to allow confidence in the development of viable 
business models that use these BiOS licensed technologies. 
à The BiOS License structure must be scalable, and it should 
be generalisable, capable of development within these 
guidelines, and overseen by diverse institutions.  We 
recognised that different technology sets have very different 
implications in the innovation chain, and that the agreement 
must accommodate different sectors (for example, 
agricultural and medical) and different economic 
circumstances (industrialised and less-developed countries).  
Therefore we developed a suite of licenses around several 
different enabling technologies CAMBIA developed.  We 
created them around our own technologies to have first-
hand learning platforms from which we could generalise and 
help others create their own BiOS-Certified programs. 
As we have gained experience with our first-generation licenses through 
the concerns and suggestions of many licensees and potential licensees, 
we have aimed to create a ‘brand’ of Biological Open Source (BiOS) that 
is independent of institution.  The BiOS certification program will help 
ensure that core BiOS characteristics are sculpted into forms that allow 
institutions to preserve their own cultures and priorities.  They may do 
this through the medium of patent licensing or through materials 
transfer agreements (MTAs), a common form of bailment used to 
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provide materials for life sciences research, such as bacterial strains, 
plant lines, cell cultures or DNA. 
The certification approach has been particularly valuable in software 
development, through the activities of the Open Source Initiative15 
which oversees the branding of such licenses associated with copyright 
of free and open source software.  However, life sciences are extremely 
sector-specific and technology-specific, and it is impossible to forecast 
or fully anticipate the emerging patent rights; these facts complicate 
BiOS certification and licensing.  Of course these same challenges also 
render patent-based BiOS licensing and MTAs even more necessary. 
Patent Lens: A Platform for Understanding IP Landscapes 
With funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, in 1999 CAMBIA began 
to develop an integrated, full-text database of patents in the agricultural 
sciences.  Under the initial guidance of Dr Carol Nottenburg, then 
CAMBIA’s Director of Intellectual Property, the CAMBIA IP Resource 
became a prominent web-based data tool to investigate patents in this 
field.  Over the years, both the ambitions and the capabilities of the 
CAMBIA Patent Lens team grew,16 and Patent Lens has now become 
one of the world’s foremost cost-free resources for full-text searching 
and understanding patents in many jurisdictions and in all classifications.  
Patent Lens17 harmonises, parses and presents worldwide patent and 
technology data in a full-text searchable and highly integrated manner. 
However, it is much more than a patent database.  Patent Lens is an 
integrated response to the massive complexity and opacity of the world 
of patents.  It is intended as a public platform to enable many actors to 
investigate and share analysis of relevant IP issues, and to foster 
community involvement in overseeing and guiding the patent system. 
                                                        
15 Open Source Initiative <opensource.org>. 
16 The Patent Lens was featured in an editorial in Nature Biotechnology (24 2006 474), called 
‘Patently Transparent’ which was disarmingly positive about our Patent Lens activity providing 
a critical breath of transparent fresh air to the patent frenzy that is creating a crisis in 
biotechnology.  The Patent Lens team, led for the last two years by Dr Marie Connett, still has 
its original three software informatics specialists, Greg Quinn, Doug Ashton and Nick Dos 
Remedios, and has been strengthened by additional talent, including Paul Freeland, Neil Bacon 
and Josh Cole. 
17 Patent Lens <www.patentlens.net>. 
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The patent system has grown so rapidly and become so complex and 
opaque that even the most privileged and skilled clergy of patent law can 
only parse a tiny area of specialised knowledge, and that tiny area 
changes daily.  This fragmentation has made it almost impossible to 
thoughtfully and factually assess the consequences of action and 
inaction: how can the consequences of policy be modelled or validated 
when patents are treated as fungibles?  How can efficient progress in 
sectors critical to social progress, such as health, environment, and 
agriculture, be secured when the rights are tangled in a skein of patents? 
The goal of the Patent Lens is to use the power of informatics and 
community to harmonise and make transparent the world of patents, so 
that thoughtful individuals, institutions and agencies can guide 
thoughtful and humane reform of the innovation system and to spur 
efficient and socially relevant innovation.  This is an essential platform if 
we are to make use of the patent system itself to expand and protect a 
technology commons, and to collectively target breakthrough 
inventions, work-arounds and ‘work-beyonds’18 and to make thoughtful 
and informed partnerships. 
BioForge: Field of Dreams? 
BioForge was initially launched as a web-based collaboration platform to 
take CAMBIA’s pump-priming technologies—including Transbacter 
(described later), a new generation GUS called GUSPlus, and a novel 
genetic fingerprint technology called DArT—and throw open the gates 
to enlightened self-interest.  We wanted scientists to try Transbacter in 
diverse bacteria and crops to create an open source and effective toolkit.  
The first version of the web facility was based on a very credible 
collaborative software development platform created by Brian 
Behlendorf19 and his colleagues at Collabnet.  We had hoped—in 
retrospect, perhaps naively—to see a surge of interest: scientists from 
around the world, initially from the public sector, would register, log on, 
                                                        
18 A work-beyond refers to a created technology which both bypasses and transcends the 
proprietary technology it seeks to replace.  Transbacter, described later, is an example of a 
‘workaround’, which will become a work-beyond when its efficacy and uptake increases. 
19 Brian Behlendorf is the Chairman of the Apache Software Foundation, and a driving force in 
the creation of the Apache Web server, one of the most widely used open source software tools 
in the world, with nearly 70% of the world wide web making use of it. 
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and offer to collaborate to improve these tools, and to share their 
thoughts and actions. 
The initial response was mildly enthusiastic, but within a few months we 
realised that the actual engagement and contribution of scientific or 
personal resources was miniscule.  While the BioForge has almost a 
thousand registered users, very few of them have substantially assisted 
the listed projects, technically or scientifically.  However, many of the 
registered users are from India, China, and other countries widely viewed 
as out of the mainstream of cutting-edge biological research.  This may 
reveal a latent need or desire for a better-crafted collaboration culture.  
We also believe it reflects CAMBIA’s reputation as a provider of 
enabling technology.  Thousands of our pCAMBIA DNA vectors 
toolkits are in use in almost every country, so this ‘market’ knowledge 
and confidence could also be skewing the numbers.  Still, at this stage 
BioForge has yet to create a vibrant web-connected community that 
actually does anything.  We use it constantly, as a transparent and 
inclusive ‘lab notebook’ for our own work at CAMBIA. 
To address the issue of enhancing contributors’ reputations (see 
BioForge textbox), CAMBIA has started a software development project 
called Karmeleon to create open source, modular, software-mediated 
reputation metric tools.  We hope that people in many collaborative and 
distributive projects can use these tools, and tune them to their diverse 
needs, ranging from online review of scientific publications through to 
research collaboration and product development.  Our premise is that 
individuals should be rated on their contributions by accredited (rated) 
peers in a transparent manner, but using sophisticated, multivariate 
metrics to reflect the complex and diverse nature of the value of their 
contributions.  Beyond their professional value, these contributions can 
and often do have important community and utility implications. 
If we make valid, less ‘game-able’ metrics available, users can develop 
confidence in the value of one another’s contributions, and provide 
rewards as their community norms dictate: career advancement, peer 
reputation, funding and so on.  But the reputation metrics must be 
adaptable to the culture where the contributor is working and being 
evaluated.  Our initial drafts of Karmeleon use three metrics: 
Community value, Utility value, and Professional value.  Scores in each 
category in turn impact the ‘gravitas’ of a user; we hope this will 
encourage more sensible ratings to emerge. 
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BioForge: The Challenge of Aligning Incentives and Rewards 
In initially designing BioForge, we had hoped that scientists in public 
sector institutions would come to see the value of working together to 
build powerful common toolkits to solve problems.  Clearly most public 
entities endorse and even encourage the notion of pulling together to 
solve intractable social and economic problems: market failures.  Indeed, 
this is the best justification for the very existence of a public sector.  But 
if the toolkit does not encourage scientists to solve problems for their 
self-interest, it will be irrelevant.  And if such participation carries a 
cost—in real time and resources—that is yet another disincentive. 
Furthermore, while discovery and occasionally invention are activities 
within the public purview in universities and government agencies, 
innovation—the delivery of new and tangible improvements to 
society—is not.  Hence it is not part of academic science culture to be 
aware of the challenges to innovation.  Nor does academia do much to 
reward sharing.  The metrics for success are almost always being ‘first’ in 
a field of endeavour that is widely hailed as being important and timely.  
The grind of innovation, with its need for long timelines and the 
building of confidence at many stages of product or process delivery, has 
little appeal and less relevance to academic advancement.  In fact, the 
market increasingly rewards those who monetise or sequester the 
necessary components of innovation—a perverse set of incentives if 
there ever was one.  Discoveries are routinely patented; while they are 
only part of the complex web of capabilities that must be aggregated to 
create wealth, owners can game them for short-term financial gain at the 
expense of sectoral progress. 
Success with a BioForge project—or any cooperative project with long 
timelines and complex feedback loops—requires aligning incentives and 
rewards.  The most prominent metric for academic advance is 
reputation, but the tools for recognising and enhancing reputation are 
still very primitive, including publication in high-impact peer-reviewed 
journals and serving on committees and review panels to cement 
relationships. 
BioForge lacks any mechanism to demonstrate its contributors’ 
influence and success to the community at large, or to those entities and 
individuals that have power over professional advancement.  It takes an 
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exceptional scientist to work toward improving a technology if she or he 
has no personal stake in its success. 
The long timelines of agricultural and medical research and product 
development all but forbid direct feedback when an innovation enters 
the market-place.  This is a key justification for vertically integrated 
companies: to ensure that managerial oversight creates these links.  If we 
wish to see alternative, distributive innovation in sectors with such 
challenges, we must create intermediate, interconnected and valuable 
feedback that enhances contributors’ reputations, as well as new 
incentive pulls to participate. 
 
The first generation of BioForge taught us something fairly obvious: that 
the cultures of software engineering and the life sciences overlap very 
little.  Software developers live online.  Their tool—the computer—is 
their window to the Internet.  Their product, software code, can be 
tested almost instantly and can be evaluated, rejected or accepted almost 
as quickly.  The engineer can build on tested code, and be fairly 
confident of a secure base.  In the life sciences, experiments can take 
months or years; validation, scaling and quality assurance take even 
longer. And the process can be so expensive or so specific to 
circumstances that it may never be replicated by another entity. 
We are cautiously optimistic that as we introduce new, recognised and 
respected ‘reputational’ tools, if we nurture high profile and energetic 
champions for particular projects, and if we create new incentive and 
reward systems, we will be able to move the BioForge from a field of 
dreams into a productive and focused mechanism for distributive 
innovation. 
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An ‘Apollo Project’ for Biological Innovation? 
Several months after we published our TransBacter paper in Nature, 
Nature Biotechnology—the most prominent scientific journal in the 
commercial biotechnology sector—published an editorial expressing 
scepticism that a true open source movement could happen in 
biotechnology, given the extent of entrenched norms and interests.20 
The title of the editorial, ‘Open Sesame’, implied that a vision as clearly 
utopian and impractical as that of open source for biotechnology would 
need a magic incantation in order to become reality.21  The article did 
conclude, however, that an open source movement in biotechnology 
might just take root if, in an ‘Apollo Project’ of some type could be used 
to forge a common ground to develop new collaboration norms, tools, 
business models and science around some mutually agreeable and highly 
desirable goal.22  While we at CAMBIA do not agree with the editors of 
Nature Biotechnology that the only way forward for open source in 
biotechnology is a grand-scale ‘Apollo project’ of the type they 
suggested, we do agree that it may be an attractive option.   
What would a 21st century Apollo project to spur biological innovation 
look like?  If the BiOS Initiative and the movement need such a 
platform from which to explore, create and coordinate new modes of 
problem solving using life sciences, what will that platform be?  First, 
the project would require a socially and economically highly desired goal  
                                                        
20 An outstanding article by Kenneth Cukier appeared about a year later: ‘Navigating the 
Future(s) of Biotech Intellectual Property’ (2006) 24 Nature Biotechnology 249–51.  It articulately 
described the increasing impasse in biotechnology caused by misuse of the IP system, and 
featured CAMBIA’s BiOS Initiative very prominently and favourably.  The metaphor Kenn 
used in this paper-that of maritime navigation and commerce-is extremely apt and informative.  
His paper is strongly recommended. 
21 ‘Open Sesame’ (2005) 23 Nature Biotechnology 633.  Clearly the authors did not have a young 
child to remind them that ‘Open Sesame’ was the incantation that would open the cave in 
which thieves had already sequestered stolen riches, a suitable parable for the misuse of the 
patent system. 
22 The Apollo project was the concerted effort by the United States government to reach the 
moon before the Soviet Union did.  The long-term focus may have been to reach the moon, 
but the project’s real purpose was to coordinate massive scientific, engineering and 
technological progress with industrial development, while building and preserving a societal and 
political confidence associated with success.  It wasn’t really about reaching the moon, it was 
about being able to reach the moon. 
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for which a technological intervention of great promise can be 
articulated.  The project would need to focus on catalysing new  
opportunities for problem solving, not just on creating an imposed 
‘solution’.  It would not have a linear impact, nor would it merely 
improve the cost effectiveness of conventional paradigms. 
To engage both the scientific and the business community, such a 
coordinated effort would offer an intellectually exciting proving ground 
for new collaborative approaches and new science and must require 
interdisciplinary skills.  The imagination and creative energy of science 
would be harnessed, but much of science is intensely self-absorbed.  An 
interesting problem will attract much more attention than a mundane 
one. 
The platform activities would afford opportunities for ‘spin off’ value 
for other initiatives and activities, and would have impacts beyond its 
target goals.  A broad constituency must see some merit in various 
components of the project—so that diverse, even divergent interests 
would build coalitions. 
The project would also have a credible promise, or proof of principle.23  
It would not be too risky—or too safe.  While it may be somewhat 
encumbered by intellectual property, it would not yet be completely 
constrained.  If the target has a suite of challenging IP thickets, that 
would be a platform for new strategies—of decision support, 
collaboration and invention—to emerge, allowing us to hone these 
capabilities.  It would be in a field with few entrenched interests, or 
those interests must be diffuse or distracted.  If major economic 
interests push back too early, they could slow or stall the effort. 
Finally—and critically—it would also be in an arena where civil society, 
industry and academia can engage constructively towards a détente, and 
where they can explore and validate new models of social enterprise and 
business, as well as new economic and innovation strategies. 
                                                        
23 In the absence of jet aircraft, rocket propulsion and supersonic flight, the idea of space flight 
would have seemed ludicrous to many. 
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Beyond the Thicket: Transbacter 
By about 2000, my colleagues at CAMBIA and I had seen so much ‘me-
too’ science going on around the world and the vast increases in 
patenting and vertical industry integration.  We also saw public support 
eroding for genetic modification and then for all scientific interventions 
in agriculture.  So we decided it was time to act more aggressively. 
We decided to attack the first and most prominent thicket of patent 
rights—that around Agrobacterium—which represented the beginning of 
the patent rush in agricultural biotechnology.  We chose this technology 
not because we believe that it presents a unique or critical bottleneck to 
many new entrants into the sector, or because anyone has called for 
these patents to be revoked or broadly licensed.  In fact, these tools have 
little market pull now.  The ‘scorched earth’ policy in the agricultural 
biotechnology sector has left virtually no inventive entities queuing up to 
develop products, and no public desire for such products. 
Rather, we wanted to show the potential for a new combination: what if 
we combined patent informatics and transparency with creative, targeted 
scientific research, and new normative and licensing tools?  What if we 
used it to build a true public commons of technology—or rather 
‘rebuild’ a public commons of capability.  We sought not a silver bullet, 
but rather a platform to test and explore our hypothesis that in alternate 
universes of innovation, tools and foundational discoveries could be 
constantly improving common goods, and that prosperous industries 
and business could be built on them. 
Assessing the Patent Landscape 
In about 2000, we began a comprehensive analysis of the patent 
situation surrounding Agrobacterium-mediated gene-transfer (AMGT), the 
process I discussed earlier.  We intended to publish a simple white paper 
describing this key thicket of rights.  But the task proved much more 
complex.  Ultimately we published the first analysis online; almost 400 
pages, and covering the top few hundred patents,24 it has since seen two 
major updates.  Over 1000 users downloaded it.  But as we began to 
realise the extent of the problem, we also realised that it could not be 
attacked piece by piece.  As we analysed the ‘patent landscape’, we noted 
                                                        
24 See <www.patentlens.net>.The first version was mostly a tour de force by Carolina Roa 
Rodiguez with guidance from Carol Nottenburg. 
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that all of the patents used a common language and set of definitions 
that dated to the original filings: that the inter-kingdom gene transfer 
was achieved as a unique event mediated by a particular bacterial species, 
Agrobacterium tumefaciens. 
Definitions are the key to a patent; they are critical in a patent 
prosecution to establish the metes and bounds of the claimed invention, 
and to guide courts in the event of a dispute.  And the pioneering 
inventions typically establish precedent that persists.  In the case of 
Agrobacterium-mediated gene transfer, it was widely believed and 
promoted that Agrobacterium was a one-off; a unique situation in biology.  
To this day most scientific papers baldly state that it is the only such 
situation. 
The Strategy 
My logic, and that of most biologists trained in evolution, is that if 
something happens once in life, it probably happens many times—
maybe ubiquitously.  We think of a ‘one-off’ because we can rarely see 
other instances.  So I began looking for hints in the literature that other 
bacterial species could transfer genes to plants, either natively or with a 
bit of convincing.  And I found hints aplenty.  So we set out—again 
with support from the Rockefeller Foundation—to find or generate the 
capacity for benign plant-associated bacteria to conduct gene transfer, 
and thus to develop a system that would be competent to transfer genes 
to plants, which was not infringing any Agrobacterium patents.  If we 
could do this, the toolkit would clearly fall outside all the patents over 
AMGT, rendering hundreds, even thousands of patents irrelevant as 
blocking tools, but useful as ‘background science and technology’. 
We further speculated that we would be able to develop a system that 
was not only free and clear of the onerous Agrobacterium thicket, but 
would ultimately be superior to Agrobacterium as a technology. 
Agrobacterium is a plant pathogen, which normally causes disease in 
susceptible plants.  Plants—even non-susceptible ones—seem to know 
this, and become stressed.  We reasoned that by using totally benign 
symbionts, we’d eliminate the stress on the plant, and open new 
opportunities for genetic enhancement.  If we could make the 
technology more efficient and wide-acting than Agrobacterium, a 
wholesale migration to the use would occur, even by academics.  This 
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would infiltrate the new open source norms into that most conservative 
of communities. 
The R&D 
The process turned out to be more straightforward than almost anyone 
expected, and we published our results, which described a new system 
called ‘Transbacter’, in Nature25 on 10 February 2005.  After nearly two 
years of hard work by a skilled laboratory staff, we described in that 
paper how we had induced three different genera of benign plant 
bacteria to transfer genes to three different genera of plants. 
These plants included the world’s most important crop, rice, over which 
Japan Tobacco held dominant rights, and broadleaf plants, over which 
Monsanto held dominant rights. 
The capability of Agrobacterium to transfer genes to plants is virtually 
identical at a molecular level to the ubiquitous system by which virtually 
all bacteria exchange genetic material, and even by which proteins and 
other molecules are secreted.  This similarity allowed us to excise and 
move this capability on a fairly well-defined DNA construct into the 
benign symbionts.  We were able to test the system with the most 
sensitive tools in the sector: the open-sourced GUSPlus reporter system. 
The paper received exceptional coverage in the press, ranging from the 
New York Times and Science to Nature Biotechnology and the Economist, but 
not just for its scientific contributions. 
The BiOS Licensing Framework 
To share this technology, perhaps counter-intuitively, we filed patents on 
it. At first glance, this is anathema to open sharing.  But we were 
learning the lessons of positive selection and the ugliness of patent 
gaming and trolling (for an example, see appendix).  As we developed 
the new technology we also developed, in parallel, draft licensing 
templates for a prototype ‘BiOS’ license, as I described earlier.  Two 
years later, we have over fifty licensees, including large multinational 
corporations, small companies, and diverse public sector institutions.  
We have recently stream-lined this technology to be more universal and 
                                                        
25 ‘Gene Transfer to Plants by Diverse Species of Bacteria’ (2005) 433 Nature 629–33. 
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easily disseminated, and have distributed over 300 kits of the new 
materials.  Traction is building as the technology is improving. 
But this is not really transformative, merely illustrative and instructive.  
Real transformation occurs when completely new actors are brought 
into innovation systems, and when radically new options for problem 
solving emerge.  This is our next ambition. 
BIOSENTINELS: A 3D VISION FOR EQUITABLE 
INNOVATION 
The most powerful impact of the scientific method has been to help us 
understand what had been incomprehensible; it has also helped us 
visualise and measure the parameters of the natural world.  The 
importance of measurement cannot be over-stated.  Without the ability 
to measure—to see the consequences of an experiment or 
intervention—we cannot understand it, or improve or build upon it.  
The future of biological innovation will similarly hinge on turning the 
unseen into the seen, and to sensibly report on the world around us so 
we can better respond. 
Most critically, we must democratise these abilities, both to measure and to 
respond, in order to diversify agro-ecosystems and environments and 
decentralise the problem-solving capability.  We will achieve this by 
fostering scientific method and harnessing local knowledge and 
commitment in communities that have previously been ignored or 
treated as passive recipients of help.  This is our 3D vision, and the 
BioSentinel project will be the platform for exploring and realising this 
vision. 
In many vineyards around the world, rosebushes are attractively located 
at the end of each row.  This curious planting regime does not reflect 
some shared aesthetic among winemakers or grape-growers.  
Rosebushes are sensitive to certain fungal diseases that affect grapevines 
more than the grapes themselves.  If they plant and observe roses, 
growers can easily see the early stages of fungal infection on the roses, 
and can take measures to prevent disease in the grapes.  The rose is a 
natural BioSentinel. 
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The Role of Measurement in the Next Green Revolution 
It is often said—and it is true—that the Green Revolution, which so 
transformed the agricultural and economic fabric of Asia and much of 
the rest of the world, passed Africa by.  The Green Revolution is not 
largely about plant breeding, although the short-stature varieties garner 
great attention.  Rather the great advances were in the availability and 
management of inputs in agriculture.  Water, nitrogen, phosphorus, 
potassium, acidity and countless micro-nutrient and abiotic stresses can 
each separately and together constitute major production constraints, as 
well as input costs, to an agricultural system.  Combine this complexity 
with the countless impacts of biotic challenges such as pests and 
diseases, especially cryptic or latent soil-borne diseases, and creating any 
kind of profitable and ecologically sustainable farming becomes 
horrifically complex in the best of circumstances.  Little wonder that 
industrial agriculture’s greatest successes—with their concomitant 
problems—come from homogenising these environments with massive 
inputs and then breeding and managing these artificial and unstable 
conditions to get maximum yields. 
These options are not available for transforming low-input, low-output 
agriculture into a prosperous enterprise.  When capital, infrastructure 
and communications are precarious, it becomes even more crucial to 
accurately and judiciously source and apply suitable nutrition, and to 
guide management decisions well. 
The management of natural resources, whether endogenous or enhanced 
by inputs, is the most critical and challenging bottleneck in agriculture.  
It will be the lynchpin of the next Green Revolution.  It is also the 
component most amenable to measurement.  But here is the 
conundrum: to have a sustainable and scalable impact, such management 
decisions must be made by local problem solvers, and many such people 
are extraordinarily poor.  They cannot afford to measure, and they 
cannot afford not to. 
 
For the last 15 years CAMBIA has been working on the components 
necessary to generalise this phenomenon.26  Now, with the advent of 
                                                        
26 This work has benefited particularly from early contributions of Kate Wilson and Steve 
Hughes, both Members of CAMBIA, now with CSIRO and Exeter University, respectively. 
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new scientific understanding, new proofs of principle, and the BiOS 
Framework, this work can now be brought to scale.  With initial support 
from the Lemelson Foundation, we are beginning to create an open 
source platform to use plants as versatile living BioSentinels to measure 
and report on the status of their environment. 
Imagine a plant—not necessarily a food plant—that has been engineered 
as an instrument to produce a colour, a smell, or a shape that indicates 
the level of nitrogen or another essential nutrient in the soil.  This plant 
will be developed in a collaborative, open sourced environment with 
components that are BiOS licensed and held in public trust.  It will be a 
cost-free instrument that allows any farmer to better judge the condition 
of her cropping system, and to create wealth by making careful 
decisions, informed by measurements of the unseen parameters that 
influence her crop and its environment. 
But the BioSentinel project involves much more than engineering one 
plant to make one colour in a glasshouse.  It is no mere academic 
curiosity.  We intend to develop the platform to create a modular toolkit 
for the public and private sectors alike. We envision mixing and 
matching components to sense virtually any parameter (nutrient, water, 
pathogen), transmission of this signal via open standards, and reporting 
on this parameter with any of several different detection systems (colour, 
fluorescence, smell, form).  We also intend to consider all the quality 
assurance, regulatory and other parameters necessary for diverse 
collaborators to create practical and deliverable innovations.  The 
BioSentinels will cost nothing to manufacture, once developed.  They 
will cost nothing to use.  But they will add value through the information 
they make available. 
This platform will be built using technologies developed under BiOS 
license, guided by sophisticated patent informatics to ensure permissive 
use, and will pioneer new collaborative research methods that enshrine 
and perpetuate permissive use by all parties.  The platform need not 
create GMO foods, but will create new communities of informed 
                                                                                                                  
Summarised in, for example R A Jefferson, ‘Beyond Model Systems: New Strategies, Methods, 
and Mechanisms for Agricultural Research’ (1993) Biotechnology R & D Trends, in Volume 700 of 
The Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,  53–73; K J Wilson et al, ‘..-Glucuronidase (GUS) 
transposons for ecological and genetic studies of rhizobia and other Gram-negative bacteria’ 
(1995) 141 Microbiology 1691–705. 
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decision makers who are empowered to evaluate and improve their own 
ecologies and economies. 
CONCLUSION 
At the start of the twenty-first century, science is at a critical juncture. 
Four centuries of inquiry, discovery, and invention have created a base 
of knowledge that has the potential to provide people everywhere, in all 
circumstances, with nourishment, improved health, and longer life.  But 
the institutional mechanisms that ostensibly exist to encourage the 
application of science to practical problems are today hindering that very 
process.  The norms that have evolved around gate-keeping have created 
new clergy, new impediments and new inefficiencies.  Without asystemic 
change, science’s promise will not be available for those who most need 
it, and the promise of a truly diverse, robust and fair innovation culture 
may elude us. 
Patents are at the heart of the system of institutions that convert basic 
scientific knowledge into practical applications.  The modern patent 
system was intended to advance the public good by balancing the 
disclosure of ideas and the transparent definition of limited property 
rights.  Today, it has degenerated into an instrument that is often 
misused to obstruct the public good through enclosure of ideas and 
obscure assertion of property rights that have no concomitant social 
benefit.  To the shared dismay of both scientists and thoughtful citizens, 
patent systems and the myriad gaming practices they have spawned 
today are impeding innovation as a social enterprise, and continuing to 
deprive most of the world’s population of such fundamentals as 
adequate nutrition, access to health care services, and clean water.  This 
does not have to be.  It is up to us to reclaim the beauty of science as a 
democratised tool for social advancement and wealth creation.  It is up 
to us to write the terms of the compact.  It is up to us to move beyond 
rhetoric and into constructive engagement in reforming our innovation 
systems for economic robustness and social justice. 
APPENDIX.  CO-OPTING THE COMMONS: A 
NEGATIVE EXPERIENCE OF POSITIVE SELECTION  
For nearly seven years, with expenditures of over $100 000, CAMBIA 
has battled Syngenta, the large Swiss agribusiness, in European Patent 
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Office opposition proceedings and appeals over the validity and scope 
of Syngenta’s patents on ‘Positive Selection’.  These broad patents (e.g. 
EP 601092, but with counterparts in the USA) were granted with 
sweeping claims that conferred on Syngenta an absolute monopoly on 
‘positive selection’ in plants. 
Positive selection is the provision of a benign compound—such as a 
sugar—that an organism cannot use without the action of a new gene; 
thus it ‘selects’ for those organisms that have acquired that gene.  
Positive Selection is one of the most basic tools in genetics, used since 
the beginning of microbial genetics; all the bacterial genetics in the 
1950’s and 60’s was based on one bacterial strain gaining the ability to 
grow on new sources of carbon and energy.  When I started working 
with plants, it was thus immediately obvious to me (and presumably to 
anyone not employed at the patent office) that we could easily adapt this 
concept to plant genetics, to determine when a new gene had been 
added to a crop plant, and that a good first use would be my GUS gene. 
So I began adapting GUS for this purpose, around the time I started 
sending out GUS kits and information, and giving hundreds of lectures 
on its use.  While this mode of distribution was to dramatically change 
the field, it also allowed some aspects of the system to be co-opted.  Our 
ideas and hard work were basically turned from ‘non-rival’ goods that 
were available for all as we intended, into a private monopoly that could, 
and did, suppress innovation by competitors. 
Scientists at a Danish sugar company, DANISCO, filed a patent well 
after I had given them the GUS gene, and after I had given public 
lectures on the use of GUS for such purposes.  In this patent, they were 
granted broad claims to all uses of positive selection, with any 
compound and any gene in any plant.  This breathtaking scope of claims 
was based solely on experiments described in the applications that used 
the GUS gene to activate a biological compound that would allow plant 
cultures that had GUS to stay green and be ‘selected’.  This was 
fundamentally what I had already reported at international meetings, 
with data showing that it worked.  Like many scientists, when I reported 
it at international congresses, I intended to see it shared with everyone.  
DANISCO’s intention clearly was not. 
The potential value of this patent estate caught the eye of Heinz Imhof, 
then chairman of Novartis, who intervened personally to buy the patent 
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applications from DANISCO outright.  These patents then served as 
powerful ammunition in the patent war chest of Novartis, which went 
on to merge with other companies in the vertical integration frenzy of 
agricultural biotech, to become Syngenta.  The evolving strategy of 
Mutually Assured Destruction by Patent Estate between the large 
multinationals required just such weapons. 
The breadth of the claims as granted in Europe—together with their 
counter-parts in the USA—ensures that any entity using the approach of 
conferring a growth advantage on a cell or plant to obtain transgenic 
plants would be infringing.  This left only the use of antibiotic resistance 
and herbicide resistance as the means of selecting transformed plants.   
The adverse public response to such antibiotic gene use is well 
documented. 
Thus the environmentally attractive and benign technology of cleaving a 
sugar and growing preferentially, with no antibiotics, was denied to the 
world’s agriculture community by one group of patents, whose entire 
rationale was derived from work that I had intended to make public.  
But with the patent, it was ‘enclosed’. 
I had several meetings with Imhof and others at Syngenta; I attempted 
to make the case that using GUS to garner such a powerful and 
oppressive patent position was unjust and inappropriate and would 
ultimately be a pyrrhic victory for the sector.  The discussions went 
nowhere. 
So we made use of one of the few remedies afforded in the patent 
system to small players: the opposition process.  Once patents are 
granted in Europe, they can immediately be challenged if one submits to 
the European Patent Office (EPO) prior art that had not been 
considered.  Our contention in the EPO was that much public work, as 
well as my own work, including my public disclosure of the basic idea, 
pre-dated the filings and would thus invalidate the novelty requirement 
for the patent.  We also argued that the patent was obvious in light of 
the pervasive use of positive selection in every other biological system 
for many years.  We also asserted that the patent did not sufficiently 
enable one to practice the invention, and in particular, did not merit the 
breadth of claims granted. 
The opposition process is widely touted as much more affordable than 
litigation.  No doubt this is true.  Instead of paying several million 
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dollars to lawyers so we could be screwed by a multinational corporation 
in front of a judge, we only had to pay a hundred thousand or so for the 
same privilege, but in front of a panel of patent professionals.  Of course 
reconsiderations of patent validity are conducted by the very same 
entity—the administrative machine of the patent office – that made the 
initial patent grant.  So even in the face of what we felt to be compelling 
prior art, and convincing case law, the deck was stacked in favour of the 
status quo. 
Watching the process, and the craft and gaming skills involved, was an 
eye-opener for me.  Until one has actually endured the multi-year 
posturing, arguing, heartache and expense, there can be no clear way to 
convey the dysfunction of the system, or its debilitating effect on 
inventors.  We achieved only modest inroads in restricting the breadth 
of their claims.  But we did consume years of time and huge amounts of 
money, in a failed bid to restore for public use a key application of a 
technology that I had developed and had inadvertently let a 
multinational pull into its private fiefdom.  The opposition process is not 
available in the United States, so the opportunity to lose extravagant 
sums of money there was denied to us. 
What did Syngenta do with this technology?  With the example they 
claimed using GUS, nothing.  They never made a single product using 
that tool, nor did they develop it further.  But they used the broad 
claims, granted by both the European and U.S. patent offices, to ensure 
that no other player—large or small—attempted positive selection 
without becoming beholden to them.  Later, from DANISCO, they 
acquired other examples of positive selection protocols which worked 
pretty well and were protected under the umbrella of the broad claims, 
they made them ‘available’ under a research license to unsuspecting 
scientists in the public sector.  This ‘research license’ strategy is one of 
the most pernicious co-opting approaches used by large private-sector 
companies.  Once a tool is used under such a license, the only way to 
then release a product is through after-the-fact negotiations for a 
‘commercial license’.  Several friends have gone through this process and 
reported a bare-knuckled strategy that gives the licensee almost no share 
in the benefit of the product they developed.  Few takers, of course. 
What are the lessons.  Don’t share?  This is not a lesson I cleave to, nor 
a recipe for social progress.  Could it have happened otherwise?  
Absolutely.  This example was a case study of how ‘open source’ licenses 
Science as Social Enterprise 477
could be crafted and protect the public commons, yet allow the private 
sector to build prosperous businesses using that commons of 
technology.  Perhaps I should have only sent the GUS gene and 
disclosed the information to those who agreed to terms by which they 
would share improvements that specifically used GUS; then the entire 
broad positive selection concept would likely have stayed available to all 
entities—public and private, large and small—that wished to explore its 
use.  As would the many modifications on which others had filed 
patents.  Just imagine: what would happen if the public sector 
technology transfer professionals had access to such a leverage tool to 
further the power of the commons toolkit and advance their mission?  
